There are more than one million office buildings in the United States, ranging
from small one-story buildings, to low-rise office parks, to towering skyscrapers.
Increasingly, more and more Americans spend a significant part of their
lives working in such buildings. And businesses increasingly house their
most important assets — their employees and their sensitive printed and
electronic information — in such buildings.
However, just like bank robbers who rob banks because that is where the
money is, many criminals go to office buildings to steal, assault, rob,
rape and spy because that is where their potential victims — companies
or individuals — are located.
This brief article will provide the reader
with guidance on some basic issues concerning securing office buildings in
America today. It should not be relied on as the sole basis for a complete
security plan, and does not contain legal advice. Readers should consult their
attorney or security professional for advice about their specific situation.
How Likely a Target is Your Building?
Where you are located and how attractive a target you are perceived to be
by criminals and even terrorists will, in large part, determine how likely
you are to actually be targeted. And how potential criminals and attackers
perceive your building depends, in part, on their assessment of their potential "gain" versus
the visible security measures you have. In other words, what is their likelihood
of success versus their risk of going to jail? Often an apparently "lucrative"
building that is well-protected will be by-passed in favor of the less
well-secured building, which may be viewed as "easy."
In a commercial building, security risks come from both outsiders and building
and tenant employees, and may include murder, robbery, rape, assault, theft,
fraud, commercial espionage, arson, vandalism, bomb threats, workplace violence
and (displaced) domestic violence, plus sabotage against the building owner or
a tenant, to name but a few. The heavy concentration of people and property,
coupled increasingly with "open" floor plans, makes modern office buildings
susceptible to these type threats. Plus, the always-present risks of fire, explosion,
and natural disasters have to be considered in building design, construction
or rehab, and security program development.
Architects, contractors and management responsible for designing or implementing
security in any commercial building should first identify the assets (including
people) to be protected, along with the likely threats to the facility. For example,
in a stand-alone fast food facility, the threat of an armed robbery may be high;
it would be less, however, in a two-story office building housing doctors (and
possibly drugs); and even less in small office building housing mainly accountants
and similar "low-risk" tenants. A survey of all present or potential
tenants should be made to ascertain what type of business each is or will be
conducting; what significant business assets are present; and which businesses,
if any, may constitute an increased risk to both the building and specific tenants
from criminals, political activists, etc. A single high-end jewelry store can
significantly increase risks. If not yet built, the developer should have a good
idea of the type of tenants it hopes to attract.
The building threat assessment should include a review of any known past crimes
in the building (if it is built and operating), along with an evaluation of the
type and rates of crime in nearby office buildings and in the immediate area.
Local law enforcement will usually provide area data. In a dense "downtown" area,
several blocks in each direction should be evaluated. In suburban or exurban
areas, a 1,000-foot to one-mile radius around the building may be used.
There
is, unfortunately, no "cookie-cutter" plan that will secure
each and every type of office building. Some security measures can be designed
into the building plans and installed during construction or renovation;
others will need to be developed, then implemented or installed after tenants
have been identified and operations begun. Developers and management of each
building will have to identify their specific security needs, starting by conducting
a risk assessment.
Security Risk Assessment
A security risk assessment (an exhaustive examination of the existing building
and any surrounding property including a review of the building plans and
any security processes, policies and procedures) should be conducted. Local
laws and codes pertaining to security measures, fire life-safety codes,
and building evacuation requirements should also be reviewed. Observations
of the building site should be made at various hours of the day and night
and also on weekends to determine "customary" activities and traffic
patterns. Based on the identified threats, plus any identified gaps or
shortcomings in security (vulnerabilities), developer/owner/management
can start to develop an overall security plan, including cost-effective
counter-measures.
Where management does not have qualified expertise on
staff or such staff is not readily available to conduct a security survey
due to other commitments, an independent, non-product affiliated security
consultant should be retained to assist.
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
Many security professionals advocate the use of Crime Prevention Through
Environmental Design (CEPTED) principle to reduce crime risks. Multiple
studies suggest that most criminals select their targets using a rational
(to them) decision-making process that is influenced largely by the criminal's
perception of target availability and vulnerability. Most criminals want
an "easy"
target, and don't want to be identified committing their crime. Accordingly,
CEPTD principles are based in part on:
Natural surveillance — reducing "blind
spots"
and other measures to increase the ability of occupants and casual
observers (police on the outside and legitimate visitors inside) to
see and monitor persons and activities. This includes sufficient numbers
and size windows for visibility in and out, along with low shrubs and
high tree canopies so as not to obstruct visibility;
Territorial reinforcement — establishing
some sense of "psychological ownership" and responsibility among
building tenants and employees so as to increase their vigilance, and
the likelihood that they will defend "their" property against
incursion by challenging intruders or reporting suspicious acts;
Natural access control — using doors,
walls, shrubbery and other natural or manmade obstacles to direct vehicle
and pedestrian traffic to limited numbers of controlled access points.
Isolated or "risk" areas such as loading or delivery docks should
receive special attention, including increased lighting, locking, and
observation (patrol, alarm, or when a building security staff is present,
closed circuit television (CCTV) — all to deter or prevent unauthorized
access to the building while monitoring activities; and
Maintenance and management — owners/operators
taking steps to ensure that the building looks well cared-for and crime-free
in such areas as lighting, paint, signage and the prompt repair of broken
or defaced items. This sends a message to criminals, and others, that
someone cares and is "looking out" for and responsible for the
building.
Parking and Adjacent Spaces
Special attention should be given to any underground, adjacent, or attached
parking spaces, surface lots or garages. These are frequent targets of
criminals committing theft from and of automobiles, plus robbery, rape,
and car-jacking (all sources of lawsuits against building developers, owners
and operators). Good lighting will deter many criminals. See related article:
Parking Lot and Garage Security.
Access Control
Because most security incidents occur inside a building, special attention
should be given to controlling building access. While tenants and visitors
require access, freedom of access to buildings and particular offices in
them is also very important to criminals. The nature and level of access
control (along with visible security measures such as CCTV cameras
in office building lobbies, hallways and garages) also establish the
building's security culture or "image," which is important in deterring
some criminals.
In cases of small office buildings, management frequently leaves the doors open
for tenants and visitors. If the risks are relatively low, this may be acceptable
during the office-day. Locks on all exterior doors that are closed and locked
at night should always be of high-security commercial grade, with their exterior
hinges "pinned" or welded to prevent removal. Because the perimeter
access points to the building are not well controlled, interior doors to individual
offices should also be of high security materials and locking devices. Don't
forget the frames in which the doors are set, as the doors are no stronger than
their weakest part.
As an alternative in buildings with only a few tenant employees, general building
access might be controlled with each employee having a key, or a card-key operating
a simple front and back door electronic access system. Visitors and delivery
persons would have to use a building directory intercom to seek admittance. Depending
on the system, tenants would then remotely "buzz" visitors in (convenient,
but not very secure), or be required to physically go to the lobby or entry door
to admit visitors.
Where stricter access control is necessary, buildings might use a receptionist
or security officer (proprietary or contract guard company) to screen all visitors
and employees. Where there are more than 75 employees or there is high turnover
in employees, then use of a building or tenant issued photo ID card for visual
screening is recommended. An alternative, especially in larger buildings or those
with higher risk, is use of an electronic card access control system by all tenants.
When card access systems are used, employees/tenants can be processed automatically
through one or more access-lines, while visitors can be directed to a special
line for screening and bag search (if desired or required). Temporary (time expiring)
badges could be issued to visitors who have been "approved" by tenants,
or for access to "public" offices.
Note that most mid to large office buildings (five or more stories) will require
a combination of technology and manpower to adequately address their security
needs. Systems and hardware alone will not accomplish the entire task, and neither
do guards. Integrating both into a comprehensive security plan is frequently
required.
Special attention should be given in all buildings to "common areas" such
as lobbies and hallways. Because they are often used to facilitate thefts
or sexual assaults, both men and women's restrooms should have lockable
doors requiring key access.
Attacking the Building
Malicious vandalism and major damage by disgruntled building or tenant employees
might be directed against the building itself, rather than directly against
the tenants or their property. Management should secure access to the building
ventilation system and electrical and telephone rooms, including any access
points on the individual floors. Accessible utilities (water, power and
gas) on the property but outside the building should also be secured. Openings
permitting access to the building from the roof should be secured against
entry from the outside if the roof is accessible from nearby (within 15
feet) buildings or trees.
Emergency Planning
Every office building should have an emergency plan that mitigates the impact
of any security breach or other disaster. Special attention should be given
to developing and practicing building evacuation plans. While evacuation drills
for fire and bomb threats are inconvenient, they are critical to life-safety
and should be performed at least once each year. Building tenants and employees
are constantly changing. They are less likely to panic in an emergency if
they have gained confidence by practicing evacuations and know what to do.
And lives will be saved!
Periodic Review
Finally, whatever security plan is developed and implemented, it should be
periodically reviewed to ensure that it is in fact operating the way it was
originally designed by the developer, architect and operator, and that it
continues to adequately address the changing threats to the building and its
tenants. If management does not have the in-house capability to do so, a non-product
affiliated security consultant should be retained to assist with the security
review or audit, and to provide an independent, un-biased viewpoint.
Today it is not enough just to be prepared for office building emergencies.
In the wake of September 11th, building tenants, employees and visitors are
seeking a sense of order and predictability in their workplace and security
against criminals and other controllable threats. This requires a comprehensive
and continuous approach to security by building developers and management,
from the design phase through daily operation.
Disclaimer:
This article is based on generally accepted security principles, and
on data gathered from what are believed to be reliable sources.
This article is written for general information purposes only and is not
intended to be, and should not be used as, a primary source for making
security decisions. Each situation is or can be unique. The author is
not an attorney, is not engaged in the practice of law, and is not rendering
legal advice. Readers requiring advice about specific security problems
or concerns should consult directly with a security professional. The
author of this article shall have no liability to any person or entity
with respect to any loss, liability, or damage alleged to have been caused
by the use or application of any information in this article, nor information
contained on this or any linked or related web site.